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Security

Acknowledgement target: 7 days.
Patch target: depends on severity.

Anything that lets an attacker:

  • Read or exfiltrate data outside the agent’s sandbox (~/.browy/data/)
  • Execute arbitrary code on the user’s machine via prompt injection past whatever tools the user has enabled in Settings
  • Persist state on the user’s machine that survives uninstall
  • Connect to a host other than the locally-registered native messaging host

Issues in third-party software Browy depends on (Chrome, Node.js, the GitHub Copilot CLI), please report those upstream.

Patch + ship

A security release goes out as soon as the fix lands.

Add a regression test

If the issue is reproducible, it gets a test so it can’t come back.

Credit the reporter

Acknowledged in the changelog (with permission).

Backport if severe

If the previous minor is still in wide use and the issue is severe, we backport.

For users:

Review what's enabled

Settings → Tools is the source of truth for which browser tools the agent can call. Turn off evaluate_js or screenshot for stricter setups.

Host tools are off by default

bash, read_file, write_file, grep, glob, and web_fetch reach your machine, not the browser tab. Opt in per-tool under Settings → Tools → host (advanced) when you need them.

Don't run untrusted JavaScript

Don’t ask the agent to evaluate code (via evaluate_js or run_script) from a source you don’t trust.

Watch the debugging banner

The “Browy started debugging…” banner means a session is live. Disconnect if you didn’t expect it.